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THE RHETORIC OF TRADE AND THE PRAGMATISM OF POLICY: CANADIAN
AND NEW ZEALAND COMMERCIAL RELATIONS WITH BRITAIN, 1920-1950
Francine McKenzie
Department of History
The University of Western Ontario
INTRODUCTION
In April 1948 Prime Minister Mackenzie King pulled Canada out of secret free
trade negotiations with the United States. Although many officials in the Department of
External Affairs believed that a continental free trade agreement was in Canada’s best
interests, King confided to his diary that he could not let the negotiations go forward
because a successful outcome would destroy the British Empire and Commonwealth: ‘I
am sure in so doing, I have made one of the most important decisions for Canada, for the
British Commonwealth of Nations that has been made at any time.’1 In October 1949,
while being fêted in London, Prime Minister Sydney Holland of New Zealand, made one
of his characteristic spontaneous and ill considered statements. He declared, ‘I want the
people of Britain to know that we will send all the food that they need, even if we have to
send it free’.2 These two stories tell historians a lot. The first striking thing is how
emotion, self-importance and flattery can go to the heads of prime ministers, sometimes
in ways that make a meaningful impress upon external policy and foreign relations.
These anecdotes can also be unpacked to reveal more important historical insights. First,
the connection to Britain was obviously a subject that inspired powerful emotional
responses in leaders from Canada and New Zealand after the Second World War, and
presumably also reflected the attachment of many of their citizens to Britain. Second,
Canadian and New Zealand politicians understood trade to be a meaningful connection to
Britain, both as an expression and pillar of their relationship. The third insight stems
from these two observations and has methodological implications: trade policies and
1

King diary, 21 April 1948; available on-line at http://king.collectionscanada.ca/EN/default.asp. M. Hart,
‘Almost But Not Quite: the 1947-1948 Bilateral Canada-U.S. Negotiations’, American Review of Canadian
Studies, 19, 1 (Spring 1989), 25-58.
2
Bruce Brown, ‘From Bulk Purchase to Butter Disputes: New Zealand’s Special Trading Relations with
Britain’, in Robert G. Patman, ed., New Zealand & Britain: A Special Relationship in Transition
(Palmerston North, 1997), p. 43.
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patterns can be read to gain insight into relations between states. For example, trade
patterns and policies were measures of the warmth or chilliness of a relationship and
could also be used to change that temperature. Trade links were also a subliminal and
powerful form of international contact. What people consumed both shaped and affirmed
individual values, tastes, and preferences which in turn informed national identity and
influenced international connections.3 Moreover, trade policy revealed the relationship
that governments aspired to, even if they were not always realized. Commercial
connections and the policies that sustained them can help historians to better understand
the motivations behind and the nature of diplomatic alignments.
Trade is an especially promising source for relations between Britain and its
former colonies. Twentieth century British politicians certainly believed that trade ties
were essential to political goals, especially the preservation of the British Empire. After
the First World War British politicians formulated trade policy in a strategic way, to
counteract constitutional developments, such as the Statute of Westminster, and the
growing independence of the ‘old dominions’, in order to sustain British influence, even
if it existed in an informal condition.4 Britain was displaced by the United States as the
centre of a global economy after the First World War5 and devastated financially by the
3

There are, for example, many works which examine the spread of American commercial influence,
although they are not simply accounts of cultural capitulation but also of resistance, adaptation and
appropriation. Victoria de Grazia, Irresistible Empire: America’s Advance Through Twentieth Century
Europe (Cambridge MA, 2005). Reinhold Wagnleiter, Coco-colonization and the Cold War: the cultural
mission of the United States in Austria after the Second World War (Chapel Hill and London, 1994). Jeff
R. Schutts, ‘Born again in the Gospel of Refreshment: Coco-colonization and the Re-making of Postwar
German Identity’, in David F. Crew, ed., Consuming Germany in the Cold War (Oxford and New York,
2003), pp. 121-150.
4
Darwin has argued that granting constitutional rights and equality was a way to nip dominions’
nationalism in the bud. J. Darwin, ‘Imperialism in decline?: Tendencies in British Imperial Policy Between
the Wars’, The Historical Journal 23, 3 (1980), 657-679. Philip Williamson made the case that
perpetuating imperial economic unity was ‘a central issue in the preservation of the self-governing Empire
following the 1926 Balfour Report’ P. Williamson, National Crisis and National Government: British
Politics, the Economy and Empire, 1926-1932 (Cambridge 1992), 80. T. Rooth, British Protectionism and
the International Economy: Overseas Commercial Policy in the 1930s (Cambridge, 1993), pp. 10, 318; I.
M. Drummond, Imperial Economic Policy 1917-1939: Studies in Expansion and Protection (London
1974), 422; J. Gallagher and R. Robinson, ‘The Imperialism of Free Trade’, The Economic History Review,
second series, Vol. VI, no. I, (1953), 4.
5
Historians agree that the imperial economy fragmented between 1919 and 1939 although they identify
different dates in the 1930s and 1930s to mark this change. W. K. Hancock, Survey of British
Commonwealth Affairs Vol. II: Problems of Economic Policy, 1918-1939 (London, rpt 1964), p. 291. R. F.
Holland identifies the mid to late 1930s as the time when dominions and Britain opted for the international
economy. See ‘The End of an Imperial Economy: Anglo-Canadian Disengagement in the 1930s’, The
Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History (1983), 2, 159-174. N. Mansergh, The Commonwealth
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second, contributing to the country’s relative and relentless economic and political
decline. Maintaining an imperial economy with Britain at its centre might stave off, even
reverse, this decline. As J. E. Coulson of the Foreign Office explained in 1945, ‘our
position as the center of the British Commonwealth will, if we can maintain harmonious
economic relations with the Dominions, go far to provide us with the power which we
require for the backing of our foreign policy.’6
Nationalist historical narratives of Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South
Africa intersect with narratives of British decline, even if they are sometimes told as
though they were entirely separate.7 Nationalist accounts trace an inexorable progression
from colony to nation8 and generally regard the period between the First and Second
World Wars as crucial to their nationalist awakening, signaled in part by their emergence
as individual and independent actors in world affairs.9 The timing and pace of the
Canadian, Australian, New Zealand and South African experiences of decolonization
differed, but the broad outline and pattern were the same. Such accounts generally focus
on political and constitutional developments, but there is a parallel economic story. In
the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the settler colonies experienced tremendous
economic growth within an imperial-international economy: they were specialized; their
development was export-driven; and they were semi-industrialized by the start of the
First World War.10 After 1918 the dominions realized the limits of imperial trade –
particularly the British market – and they became increasingly engaged in international
Experience (London, 1969), pp. 245-6. Rooth, British Protectionism, p. 34. I. M. Drummond, British
Economic Policy and the Empire 1919-1939 (London, 1972), p. 114.
6
J. E. Coulson, ‘The Effect of our External Financial Position on our Foreign Policy’, 30 March 1945, NA:
FO371/62420.
7
A. Hopkins ‘Back to the Future: From National History to Imperial History’, Past and Present, no. 164,
(Aug. 1999), 202-3.
8
There are many studies of nationalism in the colonies of settlement, many of which trace the beginnings
of the process to the late 19th century. See J. Eddy and D. Schreuder, eds, The Rise of Colonial
Nationalism: Australia, New Zealand, Canada and South Africa First Assert Their Nationalities 1880-1914
(Sydney, 1988), C. Berger, Sense of Power: Studies in the Ideas of Canadian Imperialism (Toronto, 1970),
K. Sinclair, A Destiny Apart: New Zealand’s Search for National Identity (Wellington 1986), W. J. Hudson
and M. P. Sharp, Australian Independence: From Colony to Reluctant Nation (Carlton, Vic., 1988).
9
As Philippa Mein Smith put it recently, ‘The 1930s and 1940s was a formative era in nation-building
through the conscious ‘making’ of New Zealand.’ A Concise History of New Zealand (Cambridge, 2005),
p. 150. F. McKenzie, ‘Coming of Age: Independence and Foreign Policy in Canada and Australia, 19311945’, in M. MacMillan and F. McKenzie, eds, Parties Long Estranged: Canada and Australia in the
Twentieth Century (Vancouver, 2003), pp. 34-61.
10
D. Denoon, Settler Capitalism: The Dynamics of Dependent Development in the Southern Hemisphere
(Oxford, 1983), pp. 14-15, 212.
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and regional economic activity and took action in an independent vein, such as
establishing independent central banks.11 The underlying assumption that political and
economic approaches were parallel meant that rudimentary economic development and
on-going commercial attachment to Britain was evidence of persistent colonial
subordination whereas economic diversification and commercial detachment confirmed
their decolonization and arrival as fully fledged states.
Recently several historians have challenged nationalist historical interpretations.
Tony Hopkins maintained that the ties between Canada, New Zealand and Australia
remained strong, vital and varied well into the 1950s, ‘long after responsible government
and dominion status had been conferred.’12 This interpretation has a specific economic
version. John Singleton and Paul Robertson have argued that a discrete imperial
economy persisted up to the 1960s.13 James Belich has pushed the argument even
farther, claiming that Britain effectively recolonized New Zealand economically after the
Second World War.14 Ronald Hyam and Peter Henshaw have demonstrated commercial
and financial interdependence between Britain and South Africa long after a Nationalist
government, ‘for whom there was no higher ambition than to free their country from
subordination to Britain’, was elected in 1948.15 These argument, as well as passionate

G. R. Hawke, The Making of New Zealand (Cambridge, 1985); J. D. Gould, The Rake’s Progress: the
New Zealand Economy Since 1945 (Auckland, 1982); J.L. Granatstein, How Britain’s weakness forced
Canada into the arms of the United States (Toronto, 1989); M. Hart, A Trading Nation: Canadian Trade
Policy from Colonialism to Globalization (Vancouver, 2002). Hart’s interpretation is not primarily
concerned with the link between economic developments and political evolution. His argument is that
when Canadian trade policy became more rational and professional, and moved towards closer trade
relations with the US, it became more mature (p. 124). The underlying logic is not wholly different from
those who advance nationalist political interpretations.
12
Hopkins, ‘Back to the Future’, 220.
13
J. Singleton and P. Robertson, Economic Relations between Britain and Australasia 1945-1970
(Basingstoke, 2002). As Singleton explained it, other economic historians have overlooked the persistent
economic ties between New Zealand and Britain so that they can ‘focus on the areas of commercial
endeavour in which New Zealand was independent.’ ‘New Zealand, Britain and the Survival of the Ottawa
Agreements, 1945-1977’, Australian Journal of Politics and History, 43 2, (1997), 177.
14
J. Belich, Paradise Reforged: A History of the New Zealanders from the 1880s to the Year 2000
(Honololu, 2001).
15
P. Henshaw, ‘Britain, South Africa and the Sterling Area: Gold Production, Capital Investment and
Agricultural Markets, 1931-1961’, The Historical Journal, 39, 1 (1996), 197-223. R. Hyam and P.
Henshaw, The Lion and the Springbok (Cambridge, 2003), chapter 6. As they put it, South Africa’s
membership in the sterling area ‘signified a commitment to sustain a world-wide monetary and trading
system that was the economic counterpart to and underpinning of the British empire and Commonwealth.’
p. 118. Tim Rooth, ‘Britain, South African Gold, and the Sterling Area, 1945-50’, Journal of Imperial and
Commonwealth History, vol. 32, no. 1 (2004), 93-114.
11
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declarations of attachment to Britain like those made by King and Holland, cast doubt on
nationalist political narratives.
This paper attempts to reconcile these contradictory historiographical trends. It
focuses on trade relations between Canada, New Zealand and Britain from 1920-1950,
beginning with a brief analysis of trade patterns between New Zealand and Canada with
Britain. It then explains Canadian and New Zealand trade policies to better understand
government interests, priorities and objectives. Canada and New Zealand are fruitful
comparators because of their similarities and differences. They were both former
colonies of settlement of the British Empire. Early economic activity concentrated on
resource extraction and their economies developed within an imperial-international
context. Although both were physically distant from the mother country, they rallied to
Britain’s side in the Anglo-Afrikaner war as well as the two world wars. Both had large
neighbours (Australia and the United States) to whom there were well developed family,
cultural, economic and political ties as well as complex feelings of attraction and
repulsion. They were also alike in being small states in the international community.
There were important differences too. Histories and patterns of settlement meant that
New Zealand was colonized by Britons whereas Canada’s French and English
communities developed different conceptions of the new nation, such that the tie to
Britain was a source of chronic political tension. In addition, Canada and New Zealand
seemed to be at opposite ends of the spectrum when it came to willingness to submit to
British direction in international affairs as well as on questions of constitutional
clarification and evolution of relations between Britain and the dominions. Their
differences make an interpretation potentially more far-reaching because Canada and
New Zealand constitute two kinds of examples.

TRADE PATTERNS BETWEEN NEW ZEALAND, CANADA AND BRITAIN, 19201950
Canadian and New Zealand trade patterns from 1920-1950 break up into three
sections, corresponding roughly to each decade. From 1920, when trade patterns reverted
to “normal” circumstances after the First World War, to 1929 (the eve of the Depression)
Canada’s principal exports were overwhelmingly primary in character and a handful of
items accounted for a large proportion of overall exports. There was some

5

diversification. For example, American branch plants in Canada exported manufactured
goods. But such diversification did not last.16 Canada remained primarily an exporter of
food products and natural resources and had two principal markets: Britain and the
United States. New Zealand exports were overwhelmingly headed for the British market
and despite slight annual variation, at the close of the decade its position was virtually the
same as in 1920. 19th century commercial links between New Zealand and Australia had
largely fallen away. From 1920 to 1950, New Zealand exports to Australia dropped from
roughly 5% to 2.5%, in large part because they were natural competitors in this field.
Both produced agricultural products for export. Because of a global trend towards
agricultural protection there were few markets other than Britain that were accessible to
New Zealand’s agricultural products. In part because of this, New Zealand developed as
a farm for the industrial imperial metropole.17 Technological advance, such as
refrigeration in the 1880s, sustained this economic relationship. The first trip made by
The Dunedin in 1882 carrying mutton and butter to London is legendary in New Zealand
history.18
The period from the Depression until the eve of the Second World War witnessed
economic upheaval and international tension. Canadians and New Zealanders felt the
effects of international economic collapse. Both countries appreciated the value of an
imperial solution to their economic problems in the form of the Ottawa Imperial
Economic Conference of 1932 which reinforced intra-imperial trade in an attempt to
offset rising protection all over the world. Following the conference Britain regained the
top spot as a market for Canadian exports, a position it held until 1939. As for New
Zealand, exports to Britain dropped by almost 15 percentage points over the course of the
decade. Even so, Britain remained overwhelmingly the most important destination.
The years of the Second World War and the initial period of postwar recovery,
roughly the 1940s, witnessed global devastation and preliminary reconstruction. The war
had almost no visible effect on the destination of New Zealand’s exports. Despite the
16

Hart, A Trading Nation, pp. 95-97.
This is a standard description of the New Zealand economy. For example, W. J. Gardner claimed that
New Zealand’s prosperity in the late 19th century was bound up in ‘expansion as John Bull’s remote farm.’
‘A Colonial Economy’ in Geoffrey Rice, ed., The Oxford History of New Zealand, 2nd edition (Auckland
and New York, 1992). Author interview with James Meade, 1993.
18
Belich, in Paradise Reforged, claims 1882 is the best know date in New Zealand history, p. 53.
17
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disruption to trade over thousands of miles, Britain saw only a slight decrease and the US
a slight increase. Britain and the US continued to trade position as top market for
Canada. After the war, the US finally and definitively supplanted Britain as Canada’s
main market. New Zealand exports to Britain held steady although there was a gradual
and long-term decline evident after 1950. (Graphs 1a & 1b)
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Graph 1b: EXPORTS FROM NEW ZEALAND TO BRITAIN AND THE UNITED
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The export stories of the two dominions were different in important respects,
including the distribution of exports and the volatility of trade patterns. Even so, their
19

B. R. Mitchell, International Historical Statistics: The Americas 1750-1993, 4th edition (London, 1998).
B. R. Mitchell, International Historical Statistics: Africa, Asia and Oceania 1750-1993, 3rd edition
(London and New York, 1998).
20
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export patterns followed the same general direction: there was an absolute drop in trade
with Britain of roughly 10% between 1920 and 1950. (Graph 2) This was a more
significant drop for Anglo-Canadian trade, representing a relative fall of 38% (from
24.1% to 15%). These downward adjustments occurred even though the commodities
being exported did not change greatly. Over this thirty year period, the top five Canadian
and New Zealand exports were constant although the ranking changed slightly. (Graph
3a) For example, in Canada, newsprint was second in 1926; first in 1948; wheat was first
in 1926; second in 1948. In New Zealand, wool and butter held steady at one and two
throughout the period, cheese and lamb switched places to three and four. (Graph 3b)
These findings suggest that economic development was not transforming what was
produced for export, although some of these exports were subject to more refining.
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Graph 3b: NEW ZEALAND’S MAIN EXPORTS 1920, 1930, 1940, 1950 (% of
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As for imports, the US was a far more important source of supply for Canada than
Britain, a position it had enjoyed since the late 19th century.23 New Zealand imports
were in a holding pattern with Britain the most important supplier by a great deal. The
US and Australia were other important sources of supply. British imports in Canada
increased briefly after the 1932 Ottawa Imperial Economic Conference but reverted to
1920s levels by the start of the Second World War. American imports fell in the early
22

New Zealand Official Yearbook 1924, 1933, 1944, 1953.
The United States first surpassed Britain as a supplier to Canada in 1876. Britain regained top spot
between 1880-1882, slipped again until it pulled even with the US in 1887, and thereafter lagged far
behind.
23
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part of the decade but were restored by its end. As for New Zealand, imports from
Britain and the US both dropped roughly 10% during the 1930s. As was the case for
exports, the 1940s were volatile. During the war American products sold in Canada
increased while British products fell. The gap narrowed slightly in the early postwar
years. American goods flooded New Zealand during the war, in particular when
American servicemen were based there. The effect did not last. After the war the United
States resumed its prewar level of supply whereas Britain’s importance increased over its
prewar position. (Graphs 4a & 4b)

Graph 4a: IMPORTS TO CANADA FROM BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES
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Graph 4b: IMPORTS TO NEW ZEALAND FROM BRITAIN AND THE UNITED
STATES 1920-1950 (% of total)
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British imports in Canada ended in 1950 approximately 30% lower than where
they had started in 1920 but significantly improved their position in New Zealand.
(Graph 5) There were fluctuations and dips, responses to international circumstances and
pressures as well as national economic growth and diversification. Britain’s market share
in Canada and New Zealand remained significant for both Canada and New Zealand in
terms of value. Although proportionally British trade with New Zealand was far more
impressive, the total value of trade with Canada was larger.24
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The principal commodities imported were also surprisingly constant. In Canada,
coal was the top import in 1926, it ranked third in 1948; petroleum was the second most
important import in 1926; first in 1948. The main shifts were in the importance of farm
machinery (14th in 1926, 4th in 1948) and cars (11th in 1926, 5th in 1948). (Graph 6a)
New Zealand saw some changes in its imports. Cars were the top import in 1926; 5th in
1948. But the overall composition of leading imports was fairly constant. (Graph 6b)
Graph 6a: CANADA’S MAIN IMPORTS 1920, 1930, 1940, 1950 (% of total)
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The economic picture that emerges by 1950 is of economic growth but not that
much development. The persistence of natural resources and food as primary exports, as
well as dependence on outside suppliers for machinery, fuel and other manufactured
goods, meant that the Canadian and New Zealand economies, although industrializing,
still specialized in agriculture and natural resource extraction. While Canada could be
considered an industrial state by 1950, New Zealand was a developing economy.
This brief overview reinforces the views of Singleton and Robertson and others
that an imperial economy was evident after the Second World War in terms of volume of
trade as well as patterns of economic development which perpetuated commercial links
between the dominions and the former mother country. If the study was broadened to
include Australia and South Africa the argument would be even more compelling.
(Graphs 8a & b) Where there was a deterioration of imperial trade, more noticeable for
Canada than New Zealand, there was a gradual evolution away from imperial trade rather
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than some identifiable watershed. The persistence of an imperial trade network has
implications for the nationalist conception of dominions’ history. Were Canada and New
Zealand still in a colonial relationship with Britain? Were they somehow less
autonomous and independent than the nationalist accounts assert?
Graph 8a: EXPORTS FROM THE ‘OLD DOMINIONS’ TO BRITAIN, 1920-1950 (%
of total)
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Graph 8b: IMPORTS FROM BRITAIN TO THE ‘OLD DOMINIONS’, 1920-1950 (%
of total)
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TRADE POLICY IN CANADA AND NEW ZEALAND
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This analysis of trade policy focuses on two episodes: the Ottawa Imperial
Economic Conference of 1932 and its aftermath and the international effort to set up the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade after the Second World War. In both instances,
Canadian and New Zealand officials were forced to come to terms with the possibilities
and limitations of an imperial economy and an international economy in which the
United States was central. Canadian and New Zealand governments had to choose
whether to trade in an imperial context, represented by Britain, or to focus on
international trade, represented by the United States. There was a sense that these
choices were mutually exclusive and had implications for Canadian and New Zealand
international relations more generally.

In 1930 Prime Minister R. B. Bennett of Canada campaigned on a promise to use
tariffs to blast into foreign markets. While the economic logic underpinning this policy
was not clear, the political message was welcome: a government under Bennett would not
sit idly by. After the election, Bennett called for an imperial solution to the Depression,
not surprising given Canadian exports were more immediately affected by the closing of
the American market than New Zealand. In addition, the Conservative party in Canada
had a long tradition of nurturing ties to Britain.
During the Ottawa Imperial Economic Conference of 1932, Canadian negotiators
focused on discussions with Britain and had little interest in negotiating with any other
delegation. However, Canadian officials were not inclined to make concessions to
British exports, also desperate for sale abroad.25 The British delegation, which had
arrived badly prepared, was shocked and dismayed by the absence of common cause and
mutual support. British officials singled out Bennett and Stanley Bruce, the leader of the
Australian delegation, for special censure for demanding concessions in a brutal way, ‘as
if they were dictating terms to a beaten enemy, as indeed they were – and all were at once
conceded.’26
New Zealand negotiators also approached the conference with eyes focused on
Britain. Like their Canadian colleagues, they expected to offer little in return for

25
26

Rooth, British Protectionism, p. 95.
J. Garner, The Commonwealth Office 1925-1968 (London, 1978), p. 106.

14

preferred treatment in the British market. As the British trade commissioner in
Wellington observed, ‘there is some idea here of endeavouring to get something for
nothing out of Ottawa.’27 But the Ottawa Conference of 1932 was not much of an
opportunity for Wellington to improve the terms of trade with Britain. New Zealand
tariffs on British commodities were already low and Britain purchased the vast majority
of New Zealand exports duty free. London and Wellington could only reaffirm a
commitment to continue to exchange favourable conditions.28
Public statements at the beginning and end of the Ottawa conference affirmed the
integrity and strength of the Empire and Commonwealth. On the opening day, J.G.
Coates of New Zealand declared ‘It is instinctive in our people that, in adversity, we
should seek not merely our own self-preservation but also the preservation and
advancement of other members of the family of British nations.’29 Stanley Baldwin,
leader of the British delegation, proclaimed at the end of the conference that the
willingness to extend preferential tariffs to one another was significant because it
revealed that the dominions were choosing ‘closer imperial unity’ over ‘purely national
interest’.30 The extension of preferential tariffs reinforced the idea of a Commonwealth
economic bloc. The agreements defined preferential margins - the difference between the
lower imperial rate and the higher foreign/general rate - which were then set out in
contractual terms. Preferential margins could not be altered without the consent of the
beneficiary, which encroached on the autonomy of all participating governments. But
even though they worked within an imperial economic context, Canadian and New
Zealand trade policies, not to mention those of Britain, Australia and South Africa, were
nationalist in conception. The imperial preference system bestowed its advantages on
imperial and Commonwealth exports by raising tariffs on ‘foreign’ (meaning nonCommonwealth) commodities, not by lowering tariffs on Commonwealth goods.31 And
preferential tariff rates were kept sufficiently high to offer protection to new industries in
Forrest Capie, ‘Australian and New Zealand Competition in the British Market, 1920-1939’, Australian
Economic History Review, xviii, I, (March 1978), 50.
28
Drummond, Imperial Economic Policy, 246.
29
N. Mansergh, ed., Documents and Speeches on British Commonwealth Affairs, 1931-1952, Vol. I
(London, 1953), p. 128.
30
Mansergh, ed. Documents and Speeches 1931-1952, Vol. I, p. 122.
31
Hancock, Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs, vol. II, pt. 1, p. 85; D. Macdougall and R. Hutt,
‘Imperial Preference: a quantitative analysis’, The Economic Journal, 64 (June 1954), 250-1.
27
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Canada and New Zealand. Hardly surprising, commentators at the time, and historians
reviewing the conference after the fact, agree that there was little in the proceedings or
results to justify enthusiasm for imperial trade.32
The imperial economic option was not the answer to Canada’s trade woes. When
the United States introduced the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act (RTAA) in 1934,
Canada was quick to line up to negotiate a new trade agreement. Britain and Australia
also joined the queue. The Canadian-American negotiations led to agreements in 1935
and 1938, in which imperial preference was used as bait to entice the US to make more
far-reaching concessions.33 The Canadian approach to trade was pragmatic. Sentiment
had little impact in the way Canadian policymakers or trade negotiators understood the
national interest.
One might have expected New Zealand to be interested in the opening of the
American market through RTAA because the price of New Zealand’s agricultural exports
had plummeted during the Depression and officials like Coates, minister of finance from
1931-1935, recognized that the British market ‘was not bottomless’.34 Nonetheless, New
Zealand expressed no interest in the possibility of negotiating a trade agreement with the
US. It did, however, introduce measures to offset its economic vulnerability. A radical
Labour government, first elected in 1935, introduced quantitative restrictions to minimize
economic upheaval brought on by external forces and thereby ensure decent living
conditions for all of its citizens.35 The government took these steps even though its key
trading partners objected to their methods.
During the Second World War, the US emerged as a more important ally to New
Zealand. Wellington opened a legation in 1942 and sent the deputy prime minister and
minister of finance, Walter Nash, to head it. A Canadian legation had been established in

32

Max Beloff, Imperial Sunset: vol. 2, Dream of Commonwealth 1921-1942 (London, 1968), p. 188, fn 6.
Hugh Keenleyside, Memories of Hugh Keenleyside: vol. 1, Hammer the Golden Day (Toronto, 1981), p.
415. Drummond, British Economic Policy 1919-1939, chap 3; Drummond, Imperial Economic Policy
1917-1939, chap. 6. Hancock, Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs, vol. II, pt. 1, pp. 210, 245. P. Cain
and A. Hopkins, British Imperialism: Crisis and Deconstruction (London and New York, 1993), p. 144; R.
F. Holland, Britain and the Commonwealth Alliance 1918-1939 (London, 1981), p. 145; N. Mansergh, The
Commonwealth Experience (London, 1969), pp. 244-6.
33
I. M. Drummond and N. Hillmer, Negotiating Freer Trade: the United Kingdom, the United States,
Canada and the Trade Agreements of 1938 (Waterloo, 1989).
34
Brown, ‘From Bulk Purchase’, p. 42.
35
Mein Smith, A Concise History, p. 155.

16

Washington in 1927. Although New Zealand officials tended to view Anglo-American
proposals for a reformed international economy - what would become the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade - with suspicion, Canadian officials were enthusiastic.
Ottawa identified multilateralism as the ideal framework for postwar trade, especially as
officials predicted that Canada would have to increase postwar exports over the prewar
level by 60% to ensure prosperity. Canada turned into a champion of GATT, defending
the principles upon which it was based as well as trying to broker agreements when
disputes emerged between its principal sponsors, Britain and the United States, as they
did over the future of imperial preferences at the inaugural meeting of GATT in Geneva
in 1947. The conference was on the brink of collapse because of Britain’s refusal to
abolish, or significantly retrench, preferential tariffs and American insistence that its
credibility was contingent on the abolition, or significant retrenchment, of preferential
tariffs.36 The government of Canada, galvanized into the self-appointed role of helpful
fixer, unilaterally gave up a couple of preferences and asserted its right to amend, and
remove, preferences without consulting the beneficiary, thereby revoking the contractual
core of the imperial preference system. American officials played up this concession to
convince President Truman that the US had largely achieved its goal of dismantling
imperial preference.37 Canadian actions thereby facilitated Anglo-American agreement,
but not primarily out of a devotion to helpful fixing. The multilateral organization of
world trade along liberal and non-discriminatory lines was in Canada’s best interest.
Without both British and American backing the GATT would not come to life.
The importance Ottawa attached to the GATT suggests that it conceived of its
economic future within an international context rather than an imperial one. This priority
was acknowledged implicitly in the lack of Canadian interest in Anglo-Canadian
negotiations. The British pressed Ottawa to open negotiations since it was keen to
improve its market share in Canada. But British overtures were largely rebuffed, in large
measure because they had little to offer to Canadian exporters. In addition, lowering
preferential rates would require equivalent and uncompensated reductions in the general
36
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rate of duty. And preferences functioned as the effective level of protection which
Ottawa was intent on retaining.38
Rejecting the possibility of deepening the Anglo-Canadian trade relationship did
not mean that Canada was submitting to the logic of continentalism. The American
economy, roughly twelve times the size of the Canadian economy, ensured that the
economic relationship would be lopsided. In Canada, debates about continental
economic organization, and the political consequences that might arise, had been hotly
debated since the mid-19th century. Different strands of the debate revealed attraction
and repulsion for both Britain as well as the US. Fear of continentalism resulted in an
effort to retain a meaningful commercial relationship with Britain. Even though the
Anglo-Canadian trade link was weakening, it was remarkably resilient in light of the pull
of continental economic forces, at work since the 19th century. If one looks again at the
pattern of Canadian exports (Graph 1a), the balance achieved between the UK and US as
markets for Canadian goods, to the point that they regularly swapped top spot,
represented the ideal to a government intent on not choosing one ally over the other.
Canadian trade policy, indeed its whole foreign policy, can be described as a policy of
counterbalance. The postwar trade pattern, in which the importance of the British market
slumped quite dramatically represents the futility of government efforts to maintain
commercial equilibrium.
New Zealand was more skeptical about the benefits of GATT. Even though
studies confirmed that a more liberal international economy would most effectively
promote New Zealand’s prosperity,39 New Zealand was nonetheless intent on
consolidating its niche in the British market. Despite economic forecasts of slow growth
in consumer demand in Britain,40 New Zealand and Britain had concluded four-year bulk
purchase agreements for mutton, cheese and wool in 1944. These agreements were
extended until 1954, effectively locking up New Zealand supply for a decade. While it is
tempting to characterize this approach as one in which there was a refusal to
acknowledge changes in the workings of the international economy and the limitations on
38
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the British market, such a description would be largely incorrect. New Zealanders feared
the return of a global economic depression after the war (a widely shared fear) and
doubted that the US would be able to reduce its own tariff on mutton, lamb and other key
exports.41 Hence Singleton and Robertson noted that the Commonwealth economic
system was ‘a bulwark against global economic (in)stability.’42 In addition, despite its
small size, New Zealand had an advantage that it could and did capitalize on: Britain
needed its agricultural exports for hungry and tired British citizens who believed that a
New Jerusalem was due to them.43 New Zealand’s leverage vis-a-vis Britain was
sufficiently strong that it erased, temporarily, the disparities of size and power. Indeed,
Britain encouraged New Zealand to continue its agricultural production after the war to
address Britain’s own food shortage which reinforced their trade dependence at the
expense of engagement in the international economy.44
Apprehension about economic instability was qualified by determination to limit
national vulnerability to the forces of international economics. New Zealand
representatives at the inaugural GATT meetings insisted upon the right to use quantitative
restrictions, (which New Zealand officials referred to euphemistically as import
selection), even though such a measure was anathema to the Americans, contrary to the
thrust of economic liberalism, and looked on askance by the British.45 New Zealand
defended restrictive devices on the grounds that they were used only to the extent made
necessary ‘by the limitation of our resources’46 and that such measures had an
expansionary effect on New Zealand’s economy.47 Although such restrictive measures
contravened the liberalizing aims of the Geneva conference, the government of New
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Zealand insisted that, ‘New Zealand’s case is entitled to as much consideration as that of
any one of the great powers.’48
New Zealand’s trade dependence on Britain was in a different league from
Canada. Britain was absolutely indispensable to the prosperity of New Zealand
pastoralists, but New Zealand was not essential to the British economy. This
fundamental imbalance in the New Zealand-British trade relationship must be borne in
mind. In addition, New Zealand’s economic position was rendered precarious by its
reliance on wool, butter and meat exports. Circumstances beyond its control, let alone
that of Britain, could cripple the New Zealand economy. New Zealand’s trade policies
were therefore formulated with location, size and apprehension about involvement in the
international economy in mind. One should not therefore accept emotional
pronouncements, like that of Holland, as evidence of a willingness to subordinate New
Zealand’s economic interests to those of Britain. Sentiment had a tactical utility to
strengthen New Zealand’s leverage in negotiations with Britain. New Zealand’s strategy
succeeded in the late 1940s because the power balance with Britain was roughly balanced
by Britain’s desperate need for food. The policy worked well in the short term. In 1953,
New Zealand was the third richest country in the world. But in the long run New
Zealand’s trade policy was flawed; as Britain recovered economically and had less need
of New Zealand meat and butter, Wellington had less pull. The bilateral balance of
power tilted in favour of Britain, leaving Wellington facing an uncertain international
trade environment.49

CONCLUSIONS
The terms of the GATT negotiations were greeted with much protest and dismay
in Ottawa, Wellington and London, particularly concerning imperial preference and
connections to the mother country. Parliamentary debates on trade policy were
passionate and conjured up powerful and visceral language of attachment which in turn
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linked issues of trade to national identity and international alignments. For example,
Walter Nash reassured anxious politicians on the eve of the Geneva conference that
‘There is not a chance of anything being done by this Government that will breach the
relations of New Zealand with the Old Country.’50 In London an insightful British M.P.
observed, sentimental pronouncements were misleading when it came to understanding
the substance of trade policies. ‘Words have certain connotations which people are apt to
accept without thinking about them, and then we go on talking about Empire trade
without analysing the position.’51
Understanding the motivations and goals of Canadian and New Zealand trade
policy cannot end with politicized language of association, such as was evident in King’s
self-important diary entry and Holland’s impetuous outburst. Canadian and New Zealand
calculations concerning trade were unsentimental, as bureaucratic analyses revealed.
Simon Reisman, who joined the Canadian Department of Finance after the war, explained
that officials looked upon the revision of preferential tariffs as ‘a constructive exercise’.52
Mitchell Sharp, also a member of the Department of Finance in the 1940s, acknowledged
that there was a powerful emotional connection to Britain, but it ‘had nothing to do with
preferences.’53 Government economists and bureaucrats calculated how best to ensure
markets would remain open to their exports. The consensus was that the British market
would not grow sufficiently to support their anticipated growth and development.
Realizing the limits of the British market did not lead to wholesale repudiation in favour
of an American-centred international economy. Canada and New Zealand both continued
to value the British market. For Canada, the British market offered balance and freedom
to maneuver that went with such an equilibrium; for New Zealand it was the preferred
choice for a small and vulnerable power. One could say that their trade policies were
incoherent, as some historians have described Canadian trade policy.54 There was an
50

Hansard, 29 Oct. 1947, p. 319.
Hansard, 466 H.C. Deb, 5s, 29 Jan. 1948, cols 1254-6. Fieldhouse wrote that even though imperial selfsufficiency was revealed as futile in 1932 ‘some hot air continued to seep out in the rhetoric of old
Commonwealth hands down to the 1970s.’ D. K. Fieldhouse, ‘Keith Hancock and Imperial Economic
History: A Retrospect Fifty Years On’ in Fieldhouse and Madden, eds, Oxford and the Idea of
Commonwealth, ()p. 151.
52
Author interview with Reisman, 1992.
53
Author interview with Sharp, 1992.
54
R. S. Bothwell and J. English, ‘Canadian Trade Policy in the Age of American Dominance and British
Decline, 1943-1947’, Canadian Review of American History 8, 1 (Spring 1977), 63.
51

21

underlying coherence: to sell exports, wherever possible and to make those sales as
secure as possible in an uncertain world. Politicized and emotional rhetoric can obscure
this point. And yet that rhetoric cannot be ignored. It signaled a desire, at the level of
governments, to maintain a British connection. New Zealand’s trade patterns more
closely corresponded to diplomatic aims because the government was largely responsible
for the sale of agricultural exports whereas there was considerably less direct government
intervention in Canada.55
This reading of trade patterns and policies attempts to reconcile recent arguments
about an imperial economy with prevailing nationalist political interpretations and
advances a methodological suggestion. Trade patterns between Britain, Canada and New
Zealand remained surprisingly vital despite industrial development, economic
diversification, and the strength of regional economic forces up to 1950. The economicnationalist narrative therefore exaggerates the dominions’ divergence from an imperial
economy. However the persistence of an imperial economy does not refute the primacy
of nationalism which is revealed when one examines trade policy in Ottawa and
Wellington. Evidence from the imperial economic conference of 1932 and the
negotiations that led to the creation of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
highlights the choices made by the dominion governments in which historic and
sentimental attachment to Britain did not ultimately determine policies. Throughout the
thirty year period under study, the logic of economic nationalism dictated that New
Zealand should consolidate its position in the British market since few others were
accessible to its exports and that Canada should retain trade links to Britain to safeguard
national sovereignty and identity which seemed equally threatened by too close
association with either Britain or the United States. In short, Canada and New Zealand
chose to operate in an imperial economy because they benefited from doing so.
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